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ARTICLES
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, SELFINCRIMINATION, AND FOREIGN
PROSECUTION: THE SAGA
OF THE RYUYO MARU
JEFFREY

M.

FELDMAN*

INTRODUCTION

In 1979, the M/V Ryuyo Maru No. 2, a Japanese fishing vessel, went aground off the coast of Alaska. During the course of
the United States Coast Guard's investigation into the cause of the
marine casualty, the captain of the vessel and several seamen attempted to avoid giving testimony at the Coast Guard inquest on
the ground that their testimony would tend to incriminate them
under the law of Japan. The ensuing litigation' over the extent to
which the fifth amendment protects witnesses from compulsory
self-incrimination where the sole threat of criminal prosecution is
by a foreign government contributes to a recent line of federal
cases addressing the issue.
This article reviews the historical origins of the privilege
against self-incrimination in cases of potential foreign prosecution, and examines the adoption in Mishima v. United States2 of a
developing two-pronged test for the applicability of the fifth
amendment in such cases. The article concludes with a critique of
the emerging two-pronged standard.
We begin with a look at a curious marine casualty, the wreck
of the Ryuyo Maru.
* B.A., 1972 and J.D., 1975, Northeastern University; Partner, Gilmore
and Feldman; Member, Alaska and Rhode Island Bars; Assistant Public Defender, Alaska Public Defender Agency, 1976-1978; Law Clerk, Alaska Supreme
Court, 1975-1976.
1. Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981).
2. Id.
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THE WRECK OF THE RYuYo

On June 13, 1979, the M/V Ryuyo Maru No. 2 ("the

Ryuyo") departed Tokyo, Japan, for fishing grounds in the Bering
Sea off the northwest coast of Alaska. 3 After several months of
sea duty, the vessel received a radio message from the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) that the father of an NMFS observer on board to ensure compliance with United States laws and

regulations, had taken ill. In order to permit the observer to disembark, the Ryuyo sailed for St. Paul Island, Alaska.
4
In November, the Bering Sea is cold, dark and forbidding.

The sun had long since set when the Ryuyo first attempted radio
contact with the United States Coast Guard station on St. Paul
Island at approximately 8:00 p.m. Visual estimations by the Coast
Guard station set the swells at 30 feet or more with winds gusting
to 40-50 knots. The Ryuyo carried 781.6 metric tons of frozen
fish, fish meal, and fish oil.
St. Paul Island lacked a dock or other appropriate facility at

which the Ryuyo could tie up. The Coast Guard station at St.
Paul Island had not been advised by the Coast Guard or by the
NMFS that the Ryuyo would be attempting to land the observer
at St. Paul Island.5
After Captain Mishima established radio contact with the
Coast Guard station, the Coast Guard asked his purpose for com-

ing to the island. Some confusion ensued due to the inability of
the crew to effectively communicate in English, and the lack of
advance warning given to the Coast Guard station.
The vessel nonetheless drew near, and at 8:36 p.m. on No-

vember 8, went hard aground on the beaches of St. Paul Island.
3. The M/V Ryuyo Maru No. 2, official number 100833, was a large fishing
vessel with capacity of 2,961.07 gross tonnage, 1,501 net tonnage, and dead
weight tonnage of 3,947. The ship stood 305 feet long (92.95 meters) from bow to
stem, and struck a breadth of 50.85 feet (15.5 meters). The keel of the vessel was
laid in 1967 with a forward draft of 4.50 meters and an aft draft of 6.30 meters.
This and other background information on the casualty in subsequent footnotes
is compiled from documents on file with the author.
4. On the evening of November 8, the National Weather Service issued gale
warnings to the Pribilof Islands and surrounding waters. Southeast winds were
reported to 50 knots shifting to the southwest and diminishing to 40 knots during
the afternoon. Seas were reported as "very high" to 30 feet with heavy rain
forecast throughout the day.
5. No explanation has ever been provided by NMFS for its failure to notify
the Coast Guard station at St. Paul Island of the impending arrival of the Ryuyo.
Moreover, no explanation has been provided by NMFS for its directing the
Ryuyo to St. Paul Island, a location totally unequipped for the docking of a
vessel the size of the Ryuyo or the disembarking of passengers for transfer to
land.
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The vessel initially struck on the starboard side beneath the
wheelhouse and the next swell of the rough Bering Sea drove the
vessel further aground. As water quickly began seeping into the
generator area, the auxiliary engines and generator ceased to operate, and the ship lost all electrical power including radio communications6 capability. The ship's clock stopped at 1846 hours,
ship's time.
The danger posed to the vessel was extreme. The vessel was
immobile, grounded in the sea bottom. The seas were too rough
and the distance from the boat to shore too great to enable the
crew to swim to shore or permit transportation of the crew from
the Ryuyo to shore by small boat. The vessel was in serious jeopardy of "breaking up", and the midnight sun had long since set,
leaving the area in total blackness for more than two-thirds of
each day.
At 9:07 p.m., the first rescue parties on shore sighted the
Ryuyo and a line was established between the ship and the shore.
Personnel were evacuated one by one using a bosun's chair. By
approximately 3:45 a.m. on the following morning, November 9,
all personnel had been safely removed from the ship. In proper
seafaring tradition, Captain Mishima was the last person to leave
the vessel. The crew was transported to the Coast Guard Loran
station.
On the following evening, November 10, seventy of the crewmen of the Ryuyo were transferred to the Zuiuu Maru No. 2, another Japanese vessel, for transportation back to Japan. Ten crew
members, the bosun, and the four chief officers remained at St.
Paul Island to assist in clean-up efforts. All were paroled to the
custody of the7 United States Coast Guard upon entry into the
United States.
On the morning of November 9 an oil sheen could be seen
6. Ship's time was set to Greenwich Mean Time, 22 hours ahead of local
time.
7. Because the crew members did not anticipate disembarking in the
United States, none carried passports or other documents permitting entry into
this country. Provisions of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1287 (1976) permit entry of alien
crewmen into the United States under certain circumstances and authorize the
parole of such crewmen to the custody of the United States Coast Guard, the
owners of the vessel, or other suitable authorities. In this case, the seamen were
paroled to the custody of the United States Coast Guard, and their "mariner's
papers", documents of transit, were seized by the Coast Guard and held for security.
See United States ex rel. Martinez-Angosto v. Mason, 344 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.
1965); United States v. Seaboard Surety Co., 239 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1957); Savelis
v. Vlachos, 137 F. Supp. 389, (E.D. Va. 1955), afl'd, 248 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1957);
and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1281, 1282, and 1284 (1976).

UCLA-ALASKA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 11:119

surrounding the ship. By November 11, an estimated 30,000 gallons of uncontaminated oil and 70,000 to 80,000 gallons of oil-sea
Water emulsion remained in the vessel. 8 It was feared that the

vessel would eventually break apart, spilling still more oil and
decomposed fish products which had been stored on board into
the surrounding environment. Officials believed that the oil spill
and risk of further pollution posed a substantial ecological danger

to birds, fish, and mammals in the immediate vicinity of the vessel.9 Although attempts were made to stabilize the vessel and contain the pollution, the Ryuyo could not be saved. Ultimately the
vessel was detonated with explosives in an effort to limit pollution
from the leaking oil and decomposing fish.' 0 Representatives of
8. Immediate priority was given to devising a plan for removal of the oil
remaining on board the Ryuyo which posed a threat to the surrounding environment and wildlife. Pumping the oil to fuel bladders atop the adjacent cliffs was
considered, but this alternative proved unworkable, as the cliffs towered approximately 175 feet above the shore line. Transfer of the oil to another ship was not
possible because no appropriate vessels were in the area. It was decided that an
attempt would be made to rig pumps aboard the ship for transferring the fuel to
bladders placed aboard two small landing craft owned by the National Marine
Fisheries Service and present on the island. It was intended that the fuel would
be pumped from the landing craft to the shore bladders, and from there to tank
facilities owned by the native village at St. Paul.
The remote location of St. Paul Island and the extremely adverse weather
conditions delayed supply of the necessary equipment from Anchorage, Alaska,
the nearest source of supply. Short daylight hours and the time-consuming task
of placing men and equipment aboard the ship reduced the effective work period
to a maximum of six hours per day. Weather steadily worsened through November 14 so that the line established from the ship to the beach on the island became unsafe, and personnel were finally evacuated from the ship by Coast Guard
helicopters.
9. The environment surrounding St. Paul Island provides a rich habitat and
breeding ground for numerous species of fish and wildlife. Several seals died as
a direct result of the oil pollution and several others died after being trapped in
discarded fish netting. Federal and state officials feared that oil discharge in the
nearby seal rookeries might disrupt breeding and rearing activities. Numerous
species of duck, goose, and loon breed in the wetland areas surrounding St. Paul
Island, and the birds are considered to be important to native subsistence hunting. Finally, state and federal officials feared that the oil discharge from the
vessel would damage a nearby salt lagoon estuary and result in failure of the
estuary to regenerate the small invertebrate creatures which grow there and form
an important food source for the local bird populations.
10. The previously frozen fish products on board the vessel were reported to
be decomposing, presenting the possibility of the creation of hydrogen sulfide
gas, a hazardous substance under the United States pollution laws.
The severe stresses to the hull occasioned by bad weather on November 14
and 15 caused an increase in the oil leaking from the ship. After elimination of
all other alternatives, the United States Coast Guard decided to use explosives to
open the bulkheads separating the forepeak tank, cargo holds, and engine room
of the vessel to allow maximum ventilation and exposure to the elements. Ther-
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the United States Coast Guard, the United States Fish and Wild-

life Service, the United States Environmental Protection Agency,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the State
of Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, the State
of Alaska Attorney General, and the United States Attorney for
the District of Alaska joined in an effort to investigate the environmental and navigational damage resulting from the grounding
of the Ryuyo, and to assess liability for the incident."
II.

THE INVESTIGATION

Upon their arrival at Anchorage, the captain of the Ryuyo,
Osamu Mishima, the third officer,' 2 the chief engineer,' 3 the second engineer' 4 and the bosun' 5 were formally subpoenaed16 by
the United States Coast Guard to appear before the investigating
officer of the United States Coast Guard Marine Safety Office at

the hearing on the grounding of the Ryuyo.
On the advice of counsel, all five members of the Ryuyo crew
declined to answer questions propounded at the Coast Guard
hearing, asserting their legal right to remain silent under the fifth
mal grenades were used to burn oil, fish and any nets remaining aboard ship.
Demolition experts directed by the Coast Guard set 1,200 pounds of high explosives aboard the vessel. The explosives were detonated at approximately 4:20
p.m. on November 22, 1979. No concussion was felt in the village area, but in
the ensuing darkness, flames were visible from the vessel as she burned for approximately 36 hours. The hull and skeleton of the vessel still sit today just off
the shore of St. Paul Island.
11. While the wreck of the Ryuyo did not pose any present threat of pollution or navigational hazard, the federal government commenced efforts to impose civil penalties and collect civil damages for cleanup and salvage costs
incurred in connection with the casualty.
12. The third officer was Akinori Ikeda.
13. The chief officer was Katuji Moriya.
14. The second engineer was Tomomi Sasaki.
15. The bosun was Hiroshi Umeda.
16. The subpoenas were issued pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 239 (1976) and 46
C.F.R. §§ 4.07-5, 4.09-5, 5.15-1 and 5.15-10 (1981). The subpoenas stated:
You are hereby commanded on the 16th day of November, 1979, at
Two o'clock p.m. before the Investigating Officer at [sic] United States
Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, Room D- 148, Federal Building and
U.S. Courthouse, 701 C Street in the city of Anchorage, Alaska to testify in the above matter and to bring this Subpoena and those voyage
records retained in your possession pertaining to this casualty.
Subscribed at the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office on this
16th day of November 1979. /s/ L.H. Walter, Lt. USCG.
Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E to Petitioners' Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Quash [Subpoenas], filed in Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D.
Alaska 1981) (Case No. A80-142 Civil).
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amendment.' 7 Counsel for the crew members contended that the
possibility of criminal prosecution by the State of Alaska,18 the
United States,' 9 and Japan 20 for pollution, environmental dam17. The questioning proceeded as follows:
Investigating Officer: Captain [Mishima], would you tell us what your
position aboard the Ryuyo Maru No. 2 is?
Defense Counsel: I will advise Mr. Mishima that he may refuse to answer that question on the grounds that his answer may tend to incriminate him.
Witness: No answer.
Investigating Officer: Captain, would you tell us briefly what occurred
on the evening of November 8th when the vessel went aground?
Defense Counsel: I will advise Mr. Mishima that he may decline to
answer that question on the grounds that the answer may tend to incriminate him.
Witness: No answer.
Investigating Officer: Captain, would you state the name of your
employer?
Defense Counsel: I will advise Mr. Mishima that he may decline to
answer that question on the grounds that the answer may tend to incriminate him.
Witness: No answer.
Investigating Officer: Okay, for the record it appears that the master,
Captain Mishima, is unwilling to testify to any questions and I'm going
to stop my questioning at this time and proceed to get legal action to
compel him to testify.
Transcript of Proceedings before the United States Coast Guard, November 21,
1979. The protection of the fifth amendment has been read to extend to aliens.
See e.g., Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
18. AS 46.03.790 (1977) provides criminal penalties (imprisonment for up to
a year for willful violations, fines up to $25,000.00, and the costs of prosecution)
for violations of AS 46.03.710-.750 prohibiting pollution (including discharge of
oil) within the State of Alaska. See Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3 (Alaska 1974). See
also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, §§ 75.010 (Oct. 1978), 75.080 (Oct. 1977),
75.500-.530 (July 1978-Oct. 1981).
19. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407, 409 and 410-413 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) prohibit,
and provide criminal penalties for, obstruction of navigable waters and deposit
of refuse in and pollution of navigable waters. Additionally, the crew members
were subject to prosecution for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1284 (1976), pertaining to

the control and discharge of alien crewmen in the United States. Their officers
similarly were liable under 8 U.S.C. § 1286 (1976).
20. Japanese KEIHO Penal Code), Law No. 45 of 1907, as amended by Law
No. 251 of 1948, Article 129, provides:
1. A person, who by negligence causes danger to the movement of a
train, electric car, or vessel, or upsets or destroys train or electric car or
capsizes or destroys a vessel, shall be punished with a fine of not more
than 100,000 yen.
2. When an offender under the preceding paragraph is engaged in the
performance of his occupational duties, he shall be punished with imrisonment for not more than three years or a find of not more than
00,000 yen.
The above provision is made applicable outside of Japanese territorial waters by
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age, and/or maritime violations related to the casualty provided
the crew members with a valid basis under the fifth amendment to
refuse to respond to questions about the incident as their answers
might tend to incriminate them.
The investigating officer for the Coast Guard sought and obtained 2 l from the Department of Justice grants of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002,22 6004,23 and 28 C.F.R. § 0.17524 in
order to compel the testimony of the five Ryuyo seamen. The inArticle 1(2) which provides: "2. [This code shall apply to every] person who
commits a crime on board a Japanese vessel or a Japanese aircraft outside the
territory of Japan."
21. See correspondence from Assistant Attorney General Phillip B. Heymann, United States Department of Justice, to R.J. Beaver, Commander, United
States Coast Guard, Chief, Claims and Litigation Division, attached as Exhibit
A to government's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoenas,
filed in Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981) (Case No.
A80-142 Civil).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976) provides:
Immunity generally
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or
a committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination; but no testimony or other information complete under
the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement,

or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
See also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), reh'g denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972); Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 554 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.
1977), cert denied, sub nom. Rotondo v. United States, 434 U.S. 892 (1977); In re
Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974); and In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir.
1973).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 6004 (1976) provides:
Certain administrative proceedings
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or who may be
called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before
an agency of the United States, the agency may, with the approval of
the Attorney General, issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section, an order requiring the individual to give testimony or provide
other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as

provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b)

An agency of the United States may issue an order under sub-

section (a) of this section only if in its judgment-
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vestigating officer contended that since these grants of immunity

were constitutionally binding upon the State of Alaska, 25 the five
subpoenaed seamen were precluded from further assertion of their
fifth amendment rights to avoid self-incrimination; accordingly,
he ordered them to "appear, testify, and provide such other infor-

mation as [the
investigating officer] orders in the [Ryuyo]
26
investigation."

The seamen, however, asserted that the grants of immunity
were insufficient to protect them against possible prosecution under Japanese law, as they were not binding upon prosecuting authorities in Japan.27 As a result, any statements or testimony
given by the seamen in proceedings in the United States could be
used against them in connection with criminal prosecutions initi28
ated in Japan.
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual
may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify
or provide other information on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination.
See also F.T.C. v. Foucha, 356 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Ala. 1973) and United States v.
Welden, 377 U.S. 95 (1964).
24. 28 C.F.R. § 0.175 (1981) provides:
Judicial andadministrativeproceedings
(a) The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division is authorized to exercise the authority vested in the Attorney
General by 18 U.S.C. 6003, to approve the application of a U.S. attorney to a Federal court for an order compelling testimony or the production of information by a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary
to a court or grand jury of the United States, and the authority vested in
the Attorney General by 18 U.S.C. 6004 to approve the issuance by an
agency of the United States of an order compelling testimony or the
production of information by a witness in a proceeding before the
agency, when the subject matter of the case or proceeding is either
within the cognizance of the Criminal Division or is not within the cognizance of the Divisions or Administration designated in paragraphs
(b) and (c) of this section.
25. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). These decisions together held that the grant of
immunity by one jurisdiction, federal or state, is binding on the other. See also
Surina v. Buckalew, 629 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1981).
26. See Exhibits A(2), B(2), C(2), D(2), and E(2) to the government's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoenas filed in Mishima v. United
States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981) (Case No. A80-142 Civil).
27. No treaty or principle of international or Japanese law made the United
States government's grants of immunity to the Ryuyo seamen binding upon judicial officers in Japan.
28. Japanese law provides criminal penalties for culpable negligence in connection with the grounding of or damage to a Japanese vessel, even while outside
Japanese territorial waters. See note 20 supra.
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THE MOTION

To QUASH

After several continuances and much discussion among the
parties, the Coast Guard's investigating officer and counsel for the
Ryuyo seamen agreed that the investigative hearing would be
postponed until the propriety of the seamen's assertion of their
fifth amendment right to avoid testimony due to possible incrimination under foreign law had been decided by the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska. 29 Thus, on May 14, 1980,
approximately six months after the grounding of the Ryuyo, the
Ryuyo seamen petitioned the United States District Court for the
District of Alaska, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to quash the administrative subpoenas and the order
compelling their appearance and testimony at the investigative
hearing. 30 The seamen asserted in their motion that the witnesses
were entitled to assert their right to avoid compulsory self-incrimination pursuant to the fifth amendment because the grant of immunity issued by the Justice Department was insufficient, as a
matter of law, to protect the witnesses against possible incrimination under Japanese law. 3 1 The motion to quash presented to the
court the novel and largely unresolved issue of the extent to which
the fifth amendment protects a witness from self-incrimination
when the only possibility of prosecution is under the law of a foreign jurisdiction. 32 Before considering the result of the witnesses'
motion to quash the subpoenas in the District Court, it is appropriate to pause at this juncture to review the jurisprudential and
constitutional history of the fifth amendment upon which the motion was based.
29. Pursuant to a stipulation reached between the Coast Guard, the seamen,

and the owners of the Ryuyo, the seamen were permitted to return to Japan
pending disposition of their motion to quash the subpoenas, based upon the
promise of the owners of the vessel to return the seamen to Anchorage should the
district court ultimately order that they provide testimony in response to the
Coast Guard's inquiries.
30. See Motion to Quash Subpoenas, Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Quash Subpoenas, and exhibits filed in Osamu Mishima v. United States, 507 F.
Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981) (Case No. A80-142 Civil).
31. Id. Motion to Quash Subpoenas at 8.
32. Since a grant of immunity is valid only if it is co-extensive with the scope
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the motion to quash the subpoenas
posed the constitutional question of whether the federal government could compel a witness to give testimony which might incriminate him under the laws of a
foreign country without violation of the protection embodied in the fifth amendment. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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History of the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination

The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
finds its roots in a body of English law which predates the adoption of the United States Constitution. 33 Included within the English line of cases are instances in which invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination was sustained even though the testimony sought could only have been used to convict the witness in
another jurisdiction. 34 For example, in the 1749 case of East India
Co. v. Campbell35 the Court of Exchequer held that the privilege
against self-incrimination protected witnesses in English courts
from being compelled to give testimony which could be used to
convict them in other jurisdictions. The court stated:
[T]his court shall not oblige one to discover that, which, if he
answers in the affirmative, will subject him to the punishment
of a crime ...and that he is punishable appears from the case
of Omnichund v. Barker [1 Ark. 21], as a jurisdiction is erected
in Calcutta for criminal facts, where he may be sent to government and tried, though not punishable here: like the case of
one who was concerned in a rape in Ireland, and sent over
there by the government to be tried, although the court of B. R.
here refused to do it ...for the government may send persons
to answer for a crime wherever committed, 3 that
he may not
6
involve his country; and to prevent reprisals.
A similar result was reached the following year in Brownsword v. Edwards.37 The defendant refused to answer questions
concerning whether she was lawfully married to a certain individual on the ground that if she admitted the marriage, she would be
confessing to an act which, although legal under the common law,
would render her subject to prosecution in ecclesiastical court.
The Lord Chancellor stated, "The general rule is, that no one is
33. The privilege against self-incrimination predates even English common
law. Its origins can be found in Biblical literature and, more specifically, in Talmudic law, a compilation composed before the Christian era and divided into

general subjects consisting of sixty-three books.
The Talmudic rule "ein adam meissim atsmo rasha," when literally translated, means, a man cannot represent himself as guilty, or as a transgressor. At
several points in the Soncino edition of the Talmud, the English translation is
given as "no one can incriminate himself." That right was absolute and could not
be waived or relinquished. See Soncino edition of The Babylonian Talmud, I.

Epstein et al, eds. (London, 1935 ff.) as cited in L.

LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH

(1968); G. Horowitz, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination."
How did it originate?", 31 TEMP. L.Q. 121 (1958).
34. See Brownsword v. Edwards, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750); The Queen v.
Boyes, I B. & S. 311 (QB 1861).
35. 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1749).
36. Id. at 1011 (italics in original).
AMENDMENT

37. 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750).

1982]

FOREIGN PROSECUTION

bound to answer so as to subject himself to punishment, whether
' 38
that punishment arises by the ecclesiastical law of the land.
Development of English case law in this area continued
through the 19th century, with several cases in the Chancellor's
Courts confirming the privilege of a witness to resist questioning if
his testimony might subject him to prosecution in another jurisdiction. 39 In United States v. McRae,40 the United States sued in an
English court for an accounting and payment of monies received
by the defendant as an agent for the confederate states during the
Civil War. The defendant refused to answer questions on the
ground that to do so would subject him to penalties under the
United States' laws. The Lord Chancellor sustained the claim of
privilege, distinguishing a contrary result reached in a previous
41
case, King of the Two Sicilies v. WilIcox.
Concurrently with this development of English case law, the
United States Supreme Court first addressed the limits of the protection afforded by the fifth amendment in United States v. Saline
Bank of Virginia.42 There the federal government, seeking to recover certain bank deposits, brought suit in the district court
against the bank and a number of its stockholders. The defendants resisted discovery in this civil action as to "any matters,
whereby they may impeach or accuse themselves of any offense or
crime, or be liable by the laws of the commonwealth of Virginia,
to penalties and grievous fines. .o,,43
The unanimous opinion of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Marshall, held:
It is apparent that in every step of the suit, the facts required to
be discovered in support of this suit would expose the parties to
danger. The rule clearly is, that a party is not bound to make
38. Id. at 158.
39. See cases cited in note 34 supra.
40. 3 C.A. 79 (1867).
41. 7 Stat Trials (N.S.) 1050, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (1851), cited in United States
v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). The Lord Chancellor limited the decision in
Two Sicilies to its facts, stating:
I quite agree in the general principals stated by Lord Cranworth fin
Two Sicilies], and in their application to the particular case before him
...[the defendants there] did not furnish the least information what
the foreign law was upon the subject, though it was necessary for the
Judge to know this with certainty before he could say whether the acts
done by the persons who objected to answer had rendered them amenable to punishment by that law or not ... [moreover], it was doubtful
whether the defendants would ever be within the reach of a prosecution, and their being so depended on their voluntary return to [Sicily].
LR, 3 C.A., at 84-87.
42. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 100 (1828).
43. Id. at 102.
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any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this
case falls within it."
During the next eighty years, the United States Supreme
Court generally allowed invocation of the fifth amendment privilege in cases where testimony was sought in one jurisdiction while
prosecution was threatened in another.45 Treatment of this issue
under American law, consistent with English precedent, was derailed, however, in 1906 by the United States Supreme Court in
Hale v. Henkel.46 The Court in dictum attempted to distinguish
Saline Bank,4 7 and badly misstated English precedent on the issue, concluding:
The question [of whether the privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness from incriminating himself under the
law of a different jurisdiction] has been fully considered in England, and the conclusion reached by the courts of that country
[is] that the only danger to be considered is one arising within
the same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty. 8

Unfortunately this dictum was cited with approval and relied
upon in decisions during the next five decades. 49 The dictum was
eventually discredited sixty years later by the United States
Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor.50 In Murphy, Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority,
44. Id. at 104.
45. See Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S.
372 (1905); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); In re Feldstein, 103 F. 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1900); In re Henschel, 7 Am. Bankr. R. 207 (1902); In re Hooks Smelting Company, 138 F. 954 (E.D. Pa. 1905); 146 F. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1906); and In re
Kanter, 117 F. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1902). See also In re Koch, 14 F. Cas. 832 (N.D.
N.Y. 1868).
46. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
47. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828).
48. 201 U.S. at 69 (citations omitted).
49. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1953); and Knapp
v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958). The pattern of cases is not unanimous, however. As stated in Murphy, note 27 supra the weakness of the court's dictum in
Hale Y.Henkel, was subsequently recognized by both lower federal courts and,
indirectly, by the Supreme Court itself. In Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927), decided by a unanimous court, the appellant refused to answer certain questions in a deportation proceeding on the ground that
they "might have tended to incriminate him under state law." Rather than decide the issue on the authority of the Hale v. Hencel dictum, the court held that
the privilege had been waived. See also United States v. Lombardo, 228 F. 980
(D. Wash. 1915), aff'don other grounds, 241 U.S. 73 (1915); Buckeye Powder Co.
v. Hazard Powder Co., 205 F. 827 (D. Conn. 1913); and In re Doyle, 42 F.2d 686
(E.D.N.Y. 1930), rev'd, 47 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1930).
50. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In Murphy, witnesses were subpoenaed to testify at a
Waterfront Commission hearing declined to testify on the ground that their answers might tend to incriminate them under the laws of New Jersey and New
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succinctly pointed out the deficiencies in the court's reasoning in
Hale v. Henkel:5 '
[T]he authorities relied upon by the court in Hale v. Henkel
provided no support for the conclusion that under the Fifth
Amendment "the only danger to be considered is one arising
within the same jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty."
Nor was its attempt to distinguish Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in5 2United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia . . . more
successful

Murphy resolved two issues pertinent to the legal question
posed in the Ryuyo litigation. First, the court left no doubt that
the fifth amendment allows an individual to avoid self-incrimination where his testimony may subject him to prosecution in a do53
mestic jurisdiction other than the one compelling his testimony.
Second, the court carefully traced the roots of this principle back
to English case law, including several cases in which the witness'
privilege against self-incrimination was sustained even though his
testimony might only have incriminated him under the laws of a
foreign country. 54 Another eight years would pass, however,
before the Supreme Court would squarely confront the issue of
incrimination under foreign law.
B. Self-Incrimination and Foreign Prosecution. Zicarelli and its
Progeny
The Supreme Court finally had occasion to address the narrow question of the extent to which the fifth amendment protects
against self-incrimination where the only prosecution likely is
under the law of a foreign jurisdiction eight years after its decision
in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.55 The
question was raised, briefly considered, but left undecided in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation.56 In that

case, the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation subpoenaed Zicarelli to appear and testify concerning organized crime,
York. When the witnesses were granted immunity by the two states, they persisted in their refusal to testify on the ground that their answers might tend to

incriminate them underfederal law. Adjudged in contempt, the witnesses appealed. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal law as
well as state law and, as a result, prohibits the federal government from making

any use of testimony compelled by a state grant of immunity. Id.
51. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).

52. 378 U.S. at 68.
.53. Id. at 77.
54. Id. at 58.
55. See note 49 supra.
56. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
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racketeering, and political corruption in New Jersey. During the
course of his several appearances before the Commission, Zicarelli invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to answer a series of one hundred questions. The Commission
then granted him immunity and ordered him to answer the questions. When Zicarelli persisted in his refusal to answer, the Commission petitioned the superior court for an order directing him to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the Commission and jailed until he testified as ordered. The superior court
ordered Zicarelli
incarcerated and the New Jersey Supreme Court
57
affirmed.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Zicarelli argued that his testimony could not be compelled because it would
expose him to the danger of foreign prosecution. At the hearing
before the trial court, Zicarelli had introduced numerous newspaper and magazine articles in an attempt to substantiate his claim
of potential foreign prosecution. These articles labeled Zicarelli
as "the foremost internationalist" in organized crime, and detailed
his alleged participation
in unlawful ventures in Canada and the
58
Republic.
Dominican
The Supreme Court initially noted probable jurisdiction to
consider Zicarelli's claim that a grant of immunity cannot supplant the fifth amendment privilege of an individual who has a
real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution. 59 Upon consideration of the record on appeal, however, the court concluded that
the record was insufficient to establish a "real danger" of prosecution by the foreign jurisdiction, and thus found it unnecessary to
reach the constitutional issue raised in the case. The Court observed that while the newspaper articles lent support to Zicarelli's
claim that he feared foreign prosecution, they were insufficient, in
and of themselves, to support his claim. Moreover, because the
court found that Zicarelli could have answered or attempted to
answer the Commission's questions without implicating himself
under foreign law, he was "never in real danger of being compelled to disclose information that might incriminate him under
foreign law."'60 In rejecting Zicarelli's appeal and remanding the
matter to the New Jersey courts, the Supreme Court observed:
Should the Commission inquire into matters that might incrim-

inate him under foreign law and pose a substantial risk of for57.
58.
tember
59.
(1971).
60.

In re Zicarelli, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129 (1970).
LIFE, September 8, 1967, at 101; LIFE, August 9, 1968, at 24; LIFE, Sep1, 1967, at 45.
ZicareUi v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 401 U.S. 933
406 U.S. at 480.
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eign prosecution, and should such inquiry be sustained over a
relevancy objection, then a constitutional question will be
squarely presented. We do not
6 believe that the record in this
case presents such a question. '
Careful scrutiny of Zicarelli yields a two-pronged test for the
existence of such a constitutional question. First, a witness must
establish that there is a real, and not merely remote or speculative,
danger of prosecution by the foreign jurisdiction. Second, the witness must establish that his testimony would disclose information
that might incriminate him under foreign law. Zicarelli's claim
was rejected on both grounds; the magazine articles were deemed
insufficient to establish a "real danger" of prosecution by the foreign jurisdiction, and the specific questions posed to Zicarelli were
found to have been capable of response without danger of implicating Zicarelli under foreign law.
Just three months after the Supreme Court's decision in Zicare//i, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a similar
claim of possible incrimination under foreign law. In In re Tierney,62 the appellants had appeared before a grand jury in Fort
Worth, Texas, in response to subpoenas, and were questioned concerning violations of Title 1 of the Gun Control Act of 1968.63
The witnesses refused to answer, claiming protection under the
first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth amendments.
The witnesses were then issued grants of immunity, and ordered to respond to the questions. They persisted in their refusal
and were found to be in contempt. On appeal, the witnesses argued that the grants of immunity were insufficient to protect them
from possible incrimination under the laws of Great Britain. Observing that the question of the applicability of the fifth amendment in cases of potential foreign prosecution was left open by the
Supreme Court in Zicarel/i,64 the Fifth Circuit denied relief to the
appellants in Tierney. 65 The court reasoned that the secrecy requirements imposed upon grand jury proceedings by Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 66 provided sufficient
61. 406 U.S. at 481.
62. 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921; see also 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1968), 18 U.S.C. §§ 842, 22
U.S.C. §§ 611, and 18 U.S.C. § 371. Specifically, the witnesses were asked
whether firearms had been purchased on certain dates and at certain places,
whether false identification had been used in connection with the purchase of
firearms, and whether the witnesses had knowledge of any person engaged in
illegal purchase of weapons and explosives.
64. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
65. 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) provides:
Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure.
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protection against use of the witnesses' answers in their prosecution by a foreign government. The court stated:
Our view

.

.

is that because of the secrecy of the grand jury

proceedings no substantial risk of foreign prosecution is posed.
Rule 6(e), F.R.Crim.P., provides for this secrecy. The same
court which grants immunity is the court which prevents violation of the secrecy. The government represented that it could
not violate the secrecy, even under the first sentence of allowing
it to disclose matters in the performance of its duties, without a
court order. This is answer enough to the contention of appel°
lants that the government might disclose their testimony. 7
The Fifth Circuit was not alone in its view that the secrecy
provision of Rule 6(e) provides sufficient protection to a grand
jury witness to eliminate any "real danger" of his testimony being
used against him in connection with a foreign prosecution. The
Tenth Circuit had adopted the same position in In re Parker,68 a
case which preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Zicarelli by
three years but was later vacated as moot by the Supreme Court.
Two years after Tierney, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
afforded similar treatment of the issue in the context of grand jury
proceedings. In In re Weir, 69 the appellant was cited for civil contempt for his failure to answer questions by a federal grand jury
investigating importation of marijuana from Mexico. Weir contended that the immunity granted to him by the court was insufficient to protect him since his testimony before the grand jury
might be used in connection with prosecution in Mexico. The
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for
the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a
juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose
matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the
court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or
when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with
this rule.
18 U.S.C. Rule 6(e) (1976).
67. 465 F.2d at 811 (footnote omitted).
68. 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), iacaled 397 U.S. 96 (1970). In Parker the
district court held that "[t]he fifth amendment was intended to protect against
self-incrimination for crimes committed against the United States and the several
states but need not and should not be interpreted as applying to acts made criminal by the laws of a foreign nation." (411 F.2d at 1070). The United States
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Zicarelli expressly rejected this view,
however, and the Supreme Court vacated the appeal in Parker upon a petition
by the government alleging mootness.
69. 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974).
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Ninth Circuit tersely disposed of Weir's argument, avoiding any
analysis of the issue:
The short answer is that the grand jury proceedings are secret,
F.R.Crim.P. 6, and we cannot assume that the rule will be broken and that
proceedings disclosed to the Mexican
70
government.
The same result was reached, with the issue given only
slightly greater consideration, by the Ninth Circuit in a case
brought five years later. In In re FederalGrandJury Witness (Lemieux),71 Lemieux was found in contempt of court after refusing
to answer questions before a federal grand jury under a grant of
immunity. Like Weir, Lemieux contended that his testimony
could leak out and subject him to foreign prosecution. The Ninth
Circuit rejected Lemieux's claim and adopted the Fifth Circuit's
view, 72 holding that the protection afforded by Rule 6(e) eliminated any "real and substantial danger of foreign prosecution because the district court had73 the power and duty to preserve the
secrecy of the grand jury."
This view of Rule 6(e)'s protection, however, has not been
universally shared. In In re Cardassi,74 the Connecticut District
Court specifically rejected the position adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Tierney and by the Tenth Circuit in Parker that the disclosure prohibitions contained in Rule 6(e) precluded any "real
danger" of foreign prosecution. The court stated:
While there is no reason to believe that any enforcement officials presently involved in this grand jury proceeding would not
honor the rule, the constitutional protection of the witness must
rest on more than faith .... it may well be that such conduct
would render the officials subject to the disciplinary powers of
this Court if the conduct and the identity of the person responsanction
sible ever became known, but such an after-the-fact
75
would provide no protection for the witness.
After discrediting the Rule 6(e) argument, the Connecticut
District Court was faced with the issue specifically left open by the
Supreme Court in Zicarefii. 76 The district court concluded that
the context in which questions are asked may establish the likelihood of foreign prosecution. Because the prosecutor in Cardassi
had conceded that the focus of his investigation was illegal smuggling of marijuana from Mexico, and because the criminal code of
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id..at 881.
597 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id.
597 F.2d at 1167.
351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
Id. at 1082.
See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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Mexico clearly penalized exporting and trafficking of marijuana,
the district court concluded that Cardassi's fear of foreign prosecution by Mexico
as a result of her testimony was "entirely
77
reasonable."
While acknowledging that Zicarelli left open the question
whether the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked
where there is a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution, the Connecticut District Court held that such invocation was proper given
the Supreme Court's prior decision in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission.78 The court observed:
While Zicarelli did not answer the question, the Supreme
Court's prior decision in Murphy provides sufficient guidance
for a determination that the privilege can be invoked in these
circumstances.
Nothing in Zicarelli impairs the Murphy rule that the privilege
can be asserted in the forum of one sovereign to guard against
prosecution in the courts of another sovereign. Zicarelli simply
applies to this rule the traditional limitation that the fear of
foreign prosecution must be "real" and not a "remote and speculative" possibility. 406 U.S. at 478, 92 S. Ct. at 1670. That test
is met in this case. Zicarelli does not appear to require any
indication that a foreign prosecution is imminent. 79
The Cardassi court's rejection of the Rule 6(e) argument was
echoed in a separate opinion in Lemieux. Judge Hufstedler, concurring reluctantly8 0 with the majority's result based on the Ninth

Circuit's prior holding in Weir,8 aptly pointed out the weaknesses
in the Rule 6(e) argument adopted by both Weir and Tierney.
The unarticulated premise of these cases is that disclosure cannot
occur without violating Rule 6(e). That assumption, however, is
unsupported by the language of Rule 6(e) itself, and was debunked as "unacceptably disingenuous"8 2 by Judge Hufstedler.
First, by its very terms, Rule 6(e) permits disclosure to a variety of individuals, including attorneys for the government for use
in the performance of their duties.83 The rule does not restrict
disclosure solely to duties related to the matter under investigation
by the grand jury. For example, if a government attorney's duties
include the cooperative exchange of information with foreign offi77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

351
See
351
597
495
597
See

F. Supp. at 1084.
note 50 supra.
F. Supp. at 1084-85.
F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1979) (concurring opinion).
F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038.
F.2d at 1168.
note 66 supra.
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cials to stop international drug trafficking, Rule 6(e) might permit
disclosure.
Second, amendments to Rule 6(e) permit disclosure to non84
attorneys without a court order.
Third, defendants may obtain grand jury testimony for a
number of purposes. 85 As Judge Hufstedler concluded:
The Tierney court's confidence that "the court granting immunity could protect appellants by refusing to make their testimony available to defendants in other cases ... " (465 F.2d at
812) is misplaced ....
Under Rule 6(e), the court cannot assure the witness that
his compelled testimony will not reach the hands of foreign
prosecuting authorities, either legitimately or illegitimately. 86
Aside from the Rule 6(e)/grand jury context, several lower
courts have declined to sustain a witness' assertion of a fifth
amendment privilege because the witness failed to establish a real
likelihood of danger of foreign prosecution. 87 For example, in In
re Quinn,88 the First Circuit observed that the witness had failed
to identify any foreign criminal statute under which he might be
prosecuted. Thus, it is not surprising that the witness' assertion of
the fifth amendment privilege was not sustained on a record which
failed to particularize any real or substantial danger of foreign
prosecution.
A similar result was reached by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Yanagita.89 In that case, Yanagita had
been subpoenaed by the government to testify at the trial of individuals charged with a series of federal firearms violations. The
government had seized a cache of weapons at the defendants'
apartment, and Yanagita had been implicated in the chain of distribution of the weapons.
Yanagita refused to testify, invoking his privilege against self84. Id See, for example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) which permits disclosure of grand jury matters to "such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government
in the performance of [his] duty." Clerks, investigators, secretaries and other
nonattorney personnel, however, are not officers of the court and compliance
with the rules on disclosure by such individuals is difficult, if not impossible, to
monitor and enforce. See note 162 infra.
85. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 868-72 (1966).
86. 597 F.2d at 1169.
87. This issue appears not to have been litigated in any of the state courts.
88. 525 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1975).. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Field), 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976) (even where defendant will be subject to
foreign criminal prosecution if testimony is compelled, interests of competing
laws must be balanced).
89. 552 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1977).
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incrimination. He asserted the possibility of a criminal prosecu.tion against him by the government of Japan, since one of the
theories advanced by the government was that the named defendants had plotted to assassinate the emperor of Japan, who was
visiting the United States when the weapons were seized. 90 Although he was granted immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002
and 6003,91 Yanagita persisted in his refusal to testify despite the
trial court's ruling that his fear of Japanese prosecution was insufficient to support his reliance on the fifth amendment.
In Yanagita, the Second Circuit utilized the two-pronged test
suggested by the Supreme Court dictum in Zicarelli for determining the propriety of a self-incrimination claim based on the fear of
foreign prosecution. The Second Circuit required "[Fjirst, that
the subject of the government's questions raise a 'real danger of
being compelled to disclose information that might incriminate
him under foreign law,' and second, that there is a 'real and substantial' fear that prosecution by the foreign government might
ensue."'92
The court found that Yanagita had failed to establish either
of the requirements. First, he relied principally on a vaguelyworded foreign penal code provision which defined "an insurrectionary or seditious act with the object of overthrowing the government" as a capital offense, and provided a seven-year term of
imprisonment for a person who aids in the commission of these
crimes by furnishing arms.93 Second, he could not point to any
case in which the act had been interpreted as applying to attempts
against the life of the emperor, nor to any case in which a foreign
citizen had been extradited to Japan under the provisions. Third,
there was no indication in the record that any question which was
directed at Yanagita required that he admit any knowledge of or
participation in a conspiracy to overthrow Japan or kill its emperor. Finally, Yanagita failed to demonstrate that Japanese authorities had any interest whatsoever in his prosecution.
It was within this framework of case law, built upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Zicarelli, that the Ryuyo litigation
was pursued.
90. Japanese KEIHO (Penal Code), Article II, 77-79; see also Extradition
Treaty between the United States and Japan, 24 Stat. 1015 (1886), as supplemented, 34 Stat. 2951 (1906).
91. See note 22 supra.
92. 552 F.2d at 946.
93. Id.

1982]

FOREIGN PROSECUTION
IV.

LITIGATING THE RYuYo CLAIM: ROUND ONE

The Ryuyo seamen's motion to quash argued that under the
principles articulated in the cases discussed above, the seamen
were entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege, since they
faced a real and substantial danger that their testimony might be
used by the government of Japan. In an attempt to establish the

basis for their apprehension, the Ryuyo seamen relied chiefly
upon the affidavit of one Captain Yoichi Ogaya. 94 Captain Ogaya
94. Captain Ogaya's affidavit averred as follows:
Captain Yoichi Ogaya duly sworn upon oath deposes and states:
1. I have been a member of the Japanese Bar Association since 1969.
2. I am a member of the law firm Yoshida & Partners and have been
engaged in the practice of law, principally maritime law, since joining
the Bar Association.
3. For approximately ten (10) years I sailed in the Japanese Merchant
Marine as a deck officer and I currently hold a first class masters certificate of competency.
4. That Yoshida & Partners has been engaged to act on behalf of
Hokkaido Fishing Co., Ltd., the owners of the Ryuyo Maru No. 2.
5. Japanese KEIHO (Penal Code), Law No. 45 of 1907, as amended by
Law No. 251 of 1948, Article 129 currently in effect provides as follows:
1. A person, who by negligence causes danger to the movement
of a train, electric car, or vessel, or upsets or destroys train or electric car or capsizes or destroys a vessel, shall be punished with a
fine of not more than 100,000 yen.
2. When an offender under the preceding paragraph is engaged
in the performance of his occupational duties, he shall be punished
with imprisonment for not more than 3 years or a fine of not more
than 200,000 yen.
The above provision is made applicable outside of Japanese territorial
waters by the Japanese KEIHO (Penal Code) Law No. 45 of 1907, as
amended by Law No. 251 of 1948, Article 1(2) which provides as
follows:
2. [This code shall] apply to every person who commits a crime
on board a Japanese vessel or a Japanese aircraft outside the territory of Japan.
6. Authority for enforcement of the above statutory provisions is
vested in the Maritime Safety Authority which has the power to investigate any cases occurring in the territorial waters or on the high seas.
The results of any investigation of the Maritime Safety Authority are
then forwarded to the public prosecutor for prosecution. Based upon
my experience I am of the opinion that there is a substantial likelihood
that criminal charges will be brought against the crewmembers of the
Ryuyo Maru No. 2.
7. By example, the author is familiar with the case of a Japanese flag
tanker Showa Maru which went aground in Singapore Straits during
January 1975 resulting in a case of oil pollution. In that case the master
and the chief officer were prosecuted and sentenced to be imprisoned
for 10 months and 8 months respectively in accordance with paragraph
(2) Article 129 of the Japanese KEIH6 on 17 July 1978 by Nagasaki
District Court.
8. I have become aware both by consultation with our client, Hok-
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stated that he was a member of the Japanese Bar Association and
was formerly with the Japanese Merchant Marines. He identified
a provision of Japanese law 95 which provided criminal penalties
for persons found guilty of having negligently endangered, capsized, or destroyed a vessel. He also explained that under Japanese law, this criminal prohibition applied to every person
involved in such a crime on board a Japanese vessel, even when
outside Japanese territory.
Thus, Captain Ogaya identified a specific Japanese statute
which, on its face, covered the activities which could be expected
to be the subject of any testimony provided by the Ryuyo seamen
concerning the cause of the casualty. Captain Ogaya also expressed the opinion that, based on his experience, there was a substantial likelihood that criminal charges would be brought against
the crew members of the Ryuyo. In support of this opinion, he
observed that the master and chief officer of the Japanese tanker
Showa Maru were prosecuted by Japanese authorities and sentenced to imprisonment when the Showa Maru went aground in
Singapore Straits, outside of Japanese territorial waters, in January, 1975. Finally, Captain Ogaya stated that the Japanese Maritime Safety Authority (MSA), proceeding with an investigation
into the grounding of the Ryuyo, had convened a formal investigation and had scheduled a preliminary examination of the crew
members.
Thus, in his affidavit, Captain Ogaya established that Japanese authorities had previously prosecuted individuals for similar
Japanese vessel casualties outside of the territorial waters of Japan, and had established an actual interest on the part of Japanese
authorities in the Ryuyo casualty.
The government advanced three counter-arguments. First,
the government asserted that while it believed the negligence on
the part of one or more of the bridge personnel had caused the
casualty, it was not likely that potential liability under Japan's penal code would extend to all five of the Ryuyo seamen and, therekaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., and also by discussions with officers of the
Maritime Safety Authority that the Maritime Safety Authority is proceeding with an investigation of the matter of the Ryuyo Maru No. 2
grounding at St. Paul, Alaska. Investigators from the Maritime Safety
Authority have convened a formal investigation of the grounding and
have scheduled a preliminary examination of crewmembers of the
Ryuyo Maru No. 2 for early January 1980. If the Maritime Safety Authority believes, as a result of this investigation, that crewmembers of
the Ryuyo Maru No. 2 have violated the penal code of Japan they will
forward the case to the public prosecutor for proceedings against those

crewmembers.
95. See notes 20 and 94 supra.
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fore, all five could not assert a real danger of foreign prosecution.
Second, the government argued in favor of the Tenth Circuit's
analysis in In re Parker,and urged that the district court hold that
the fifth amendment simply does not extend to protection from
foreign prosecution. Finally, the government argued that Captain
Ogaya's affidavit was insufficient to establish a real and substantial fear of prosecution by Japanese authorities because nothing in
the affidavit suggested "that any adverse consequences have oc96
curred or are about to occur from the Japanese investigation."
V. THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING: ROUND Two
After hearing oral arguments of counsel, Judge Fitzgerald
observed that even if it was assumed that "a foreign national may
assert a [f]ifth [a]mendment claim on grounds of likelihood of
prosecution in a foreign nation," the record presented to the court
did not permit an evaluation of the claims asserted by the Ryuyo
97
seamen; thus, he scheduled an evidentiary hearing in the matter.
In his minute order, Judge Fitzgerald posed six questions to be
addressed by the parties:
1. Whether prosecution by Japan was likely as to each of the
five seamen;
2. What degree of negligence is required for conviction under
Japan's penal code Article 129;98

3. Whether there have been prosecutions under the Japanese
96. Government's Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoenas filed in
Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981), at 10 (Case No.
A80-142 Civil).

The government feared that the Ryuyo seamen were, in fact, attempting to
conceal relevant information primarily to protect their employer, the owners of
the Ryuyo Maru No. 2. While there was no objective evidence to support this
speculation, there was a circumstantial basis to the government's fear. The government was attempting to fix civil liability for the substantial clean-up and salvage operations which resulted from the Ryuyo Maru grounding. In light of the
fact that Coast Guard regulations made ultimate collection of some of these costs
dependent upon a finding of "gross negligence" on the part of the ship owners or
their agents, the ship owners had an interest in preventing disclosure of information which might tend to establish gross negligence on the part of the Ryuyo
seamen in connection with the grounding of the vessel.
97. See minute order dated July 7, 1980, issued by the Honorable James
Fitzgerald District Court Judge, in Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131
(D. Alaska 1981) (Case No. A80-142 Civil). Judge Fitzgerald ordered that all
five of the Ryuyo seamen be present for the evidentiary hearing, but this was
subsequently modified by order dated August 20, 1980, relieving the third officer,
Akinori Ikeda, and the bosun, Hiroshi Umeda from appearing because of the
hardship posed by their sea duty during the months of August and September.
The other three Ryuyo seamen appeared for the hearing on September 3, 1980.
98. See note 19 supra.
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penal code other than in the Showa Maru case referred to in
Captain Ogaya's affidavit;
4. Whether any of five seamen had already testified in any
proceedings regarding the casualty in Alaska;
5. Whether the seamen have a privilege against self-incrimination under Japanese law;
6. What was the current status of the Japanese Maritime
Safety Authority investigation into the casualty. 99
The only witness called to testify at the evidentiary hearing
was Shun-Ichi Tagawa. Mr. Tagawa, a Japanese attorney'00 associated in practice with Captain Ogaya, was asked about the first
question, whether prosecution by Japan was likely as to each of
the five seamen. He answered:
[Tihose people, including the captain, who were present on the
bridge at the time of the incident, would have higher possibility
to be prosecuted, but for the other people even though they are
not on the bridge, if there is any faults [sic] found for their own
actions then [I do] not deny the possibility even that even
though those people are not on the bridge, they may also be
exposed to the possibility of prosecution.7 0
A United States State Department cable produced by the
government also indicated that the Japanese Maritime Safety Authority had referred the matter of the Ryuyo Maru grounding to
the public prosecutor's office in Japan, recommending action
against the captain and the second engineer.10 2 Of the remaining
three Ryuyo seamen, one was the direct supervisor of the second
engineer,10 3 and the other two were both on the bridge at the time
of the casualty.1°' Thus, based upon Mr. Tagawa's testimony and
the State Department cable, the Ryuyo seamen asserted that there
was a strong likelihood that they all would be subject to prosecution in Japan.
99. See note 97 supra.
100. Mr. Tagawa testified that he was graduated from the Tokyo Maritime
Merchant Marine University in 1960 and was graduated from the law school of
Chuo University in 1963. He had previously been employed in the marine claim
department of the Nissan Marine Fire Insurance Company, Ltd. and since entering private practice had specialized in handling maritime cases. Transcript of
evidentiary hearing in Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska
1981) (CaseNo. A80-142 Civil) at 4-5.
101. See transcript of evidentiary hearing in Mishima v. United States, 507 F.
Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981) (Case No. A80-142 Civil) at 16.
102. Id., Exhibit A.
103. Katsuji Moriya was the chief engineer and direct supervisor of the second engineer, Tomomi Sasaki, against whom the Maritime Safety Authority had
found sufficient evidence to support a referral of the charges to the public
prosecutor.
104. The bosun, Hiroshi Umeda, and the third officer, Akinori Ikeda, were
both on the bridge, with the captain, at the time of the casualty.
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Addressing the second question, the degree of negligence required for a conviction under Article 129 of the Japanese penal
code, Mr. Tagawa testified that while gross negligence may enhance the penalty imposed, ordinary0 5 negligence is sufficient to establish a violation under the code.
As to the third question, whether there had been prosecutions
in Japan under Article 129 other -than the case of the Showa
Maru, Mr. Tagawa testified that he, himself, had handled 10 to 40
such cases per year in Japan. He further testified that instances
where a vessel was declared a total loss, such as occurred with the
Ryuyo, provide the "strongest possibility of prosecution" and
would likely result in imposition of the maximum penalty

possible. 106
In response to Judge Fitzgerald's fourth inquiry concerning
whether any of the five seamen had already testified in proceedtwo of the seamen had
ings in Japan, Mr. Tagawa stated 0that
7
given prior statements to the MSA.
In answer to the fifth question, Mr. Tagawa testified that pursuant to Article 38 of the Japanese constitution, all five of the
Ryuyo seamen would have available to them a privilege to decline
to testify in Japan if their testimony would tend to incriminate
them. No penalty or punishment could be imposed for invocation
of the privilege. 08
With respect to the last question, the status of the MSA investigation, Mr. Tagawa testified that the investigation had been
completed. 109 The State Department cable admitted into evidence
by the government established that, in fact, the matter had been
referred to the public prosecutor's office 60 days earlier. 0 Thus,
the Ryuyo petitioners argued, the likelihood of prosecution in Japan was even stronger at the time of the evidentiary hearing than
it had been when the motion to quash had first been filed and the
matter was still under investigation by the MSA. The public prosecutor's inaction during the intervening 60 days was considered of
no consequence by Mr. Tagawa; he testified that delays of one to
two years in the initiation of charges following referral by the
MSA to the prosecutor's office are common."'
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the litigants sub105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Transcript of evidentiary hearing, note 101 supra at 6, 8 and 9.
Id. at 9, 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 14.
Id. at Exhibit A.
Id. at 15.
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mitted supplemental memoranda to the court. The seamen asserted that Mr. Tagawa's testimony established that prosecution in
Japan was likely as to all five of the Ryuyo seamen. The government, on the other hand, argued that prosecution for any of the
five was questionable, and was particularly unlikely as to the three
seamen whose cases had not been referred by the MSA to the public prosecutor. Additionally, the government argued that by virtue of their prior statements to the MSA, two of the seamen had
waived their fifth amendment right to avoid self-incrimination.
VI.

ANOTHER MINUTE ORDER: ROUND THREE

Judge Fitzgerald issued another minute order, requesting that
the parties address three additional questions in supplemental
briefing. Judge Fitzgerald framed the issues as follows:
1. Is it possible under either Coast Guard regulation or order
of this court, to require that the testimony of petitioners take
with disclosure of such testimony subject to
further order of the court?
2. Does this court have authority to require that such proceedings take place in camera?
3. If such in camera proceedings were ordered, what would be
place in camera

the affect on petitioners' claim of fifth amendment privilege,

given the cases of In re Campbell 628 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980);
In re Federal Grand Jury Witness, 597 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir.
1979); and In re Weir, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974)?112

Judge Fitzgerald's questions revealed his analysis of the issues. Since the Coast Guard proceedings appeared to lack the secrecy guarantees of grand jury proceedings, 1 3 his first two
questions were directed at determining whether some other means
existed by which the court could insure that the witnesses' testimony could remain secret, and thus eliminate any "real danger"
that their testimony could be used to incriminate them under foreign law.1 4 The third question was directed at whether, if such a
means of insuring the secrecy of the witnesses' testimony could be
provided, the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions in Weir and Campbell would mandate rejection of the witnesses' fifth amendment
claims.
Interestingly, in their supplemental briefs, the government
112. See minute order dated October 27, 1980. Issued by the Honorable
James Fitzgerald, District Court Judge, in Mishima v. United States, 507 F.
Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981) (Case No. A80-142 Civil).
113. See Rule 6(e), FED. R. Civ. P., note 66 supra. Compare In re Tierney,
465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
114. This is the first prong of the Zicarelli test. See discussion notes 54-93 and
accompanying text supra.

1982]

FOREIGN PROSECUTION

and the Ryuyo seamen largely agreed on the answers to these
questions. First, the relevant Coast Guard regulations" 15 do not
specifically address the question whether testimony in connection
with a marine casualty need be public or may be held in closed
session. The regulations, however, do suggest that public sessions
and public access to evidence are anticipated. For example, one
regulation" 6 permits "all parties in interest" to be present and
represented by counsel, to cross-examine any witnesses called, and
to call witnesses on their own behalf. Thus, any party in interest,
including owners of the vessel or, conceivably, representatives of
the government of Japan, could have insisted upon a right to be
present and to participate in the Coast Guard inquiry into the
Ryuyo grounding.
Another Coast Guard regulation" 7 provides that witnesses
called to testify at the inquiry may be placed under oath and their
testimony transcribed, suggesting that the formalities which normally pertain to open court proceedings also apply to Coast
Guard investigations.
Finally, two additional Coast Guard regulations" 8 provide
that information and evidence pertaining to a marine casualty or
accident may be forwarded to a marine board of investigation
along with a recommendation regarding further investigation.
Thus the Coast Guard regulations anticipate disclosure and
dissemination of the information and testimony acquired. Further, the government's memorandum stressed its need to be "permitted to draw conclusions from [the] testimony and make [a]
report of investigation,"' 9 in order to fulfill its regulatory function. This report, in turn, would be made available to the public,
thus precluding any possibility of maintaining secrecy for the witnesses' testimony.
Neither counsel for the government nor for the seamen was
able to shed much light on the court's second question concerning
its inherent authority to require that the seamen's testimony be
taken in camera. The government observed that at least one
115. 46 C.F.R. § 4.07.
116. 46 C.F.R. §§ 4.07-35.
117. 46 C.F.R. §§ 4.07-30.
118. 46 C.F.R. §§ 4.07-50. See also 46 C.F.R. §§ 4.07-55. Note that marine
board investigations are governed by subpart 4.09-17 of 46 C.F.R., which specifically provides that "all sessions of a Marine Board of Investigation for the purpose of obtaining evidence shall normally be open to the public. .. "
119. See government's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
to Quash Subpoenas filed in Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D.
Alaska 1981), Case No. A80-142 Civil at 2.
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case' 20 suggests that such compelled in camera testimony may be
improper because it would require disclosure prohibited by the
fifth amendment.
The parties disagreed with respect to the third question, the
application of the Ninth Circuit grand jury cases' 2' to the taking
of in camera testimony in the instant case. Notwithstanding its
professed need to make a public report concerning the cause of
the casualty, the Coast Guard disingenuously asserted that the secrecy afforded by the taking of testimony in camera would provide
sufficient protection for each witness from any adverse effect in
Japan. Conversely, the seamen argued that because of the likelihood of dissemination of their testimony in an official Coast
Guard report following the inquiry, an order requiring that their
testimony be taken in camera would provide even22 less protection
than would Rule 6(e) in the grand jury context.
VII.

THE DECISION

On February 11, 1981, fifteen months after the Ryuyo ran
aground off the coast of St. Paul Island, Judge Fitzgerald rendered
his decision on the seamen's motion to quash the subpoenas issued by the United States Coast Guard. 23 Judge Fitzgerald
adopted the two-pronged test articulated by the Second Circuit in
United States v. Yanagita 124 and the Supreme Court in Zi120. In re Brogna, 589 F.2d 24, 28 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1978).
121. See In re Weir, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, Weir v. United
States, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); In re Federal Grand Jury Witness, 597 F.2d 1166
(9th Cir. 1979); and In re Campbell, 628 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980).
122. Based on Judge Hufstedler's concurring opinion in In re Federal Grand
Jury Witness, 597 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1979) and In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp.
1080 (D. Conn. 1972) the seamen argued that even Rule 6(e) in the grand jury
context fails to provide adequate protection to the witness who fears that his
testimony before the grand jury may be used in connection with a prosecution by
a foreign jurisdiction. Because the Coast Guard was under a regulatory obligation to make public its findings and recommendations following the inquiry, the
taking of testimony in chambers presented no real solution to the problem. As
the Ryuyo seamen noted in their supplemental memorandum:
It is not overly simplistic to say that if the information cannot be disclosed beyond the court's chambers then it is of no use to the government and similarly, if the information is of any use to the Coast Guard
it must be disclosed beyond the doors of the court's chambers, and
thereby portends possible self-incrimination by the petitioners. Second
Supplemental Memorandum of Petitioners in Support of Motion to
Quash at 14, Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska
1981) (Case No. A80-142 Civil).
123. Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981).
124. 552 F.2d 940 (2nd Cir. 1977).
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carefli. 125 As noted above, that test requires that one invoking the
fifth amendment privilege establish, first, that the government's
questions raise "a real danger of being compelled to disclose information that might incriminate him under foreign law"; and
second, that there is a "real and substantial fear of
26
prosecution."
Judge Fitzgerald found that all the Ryuyo seamen met the
first prong of the test, since Article 129127 of the Japanese penal
code is applicable to incidents occuring outside of Japanese waters 28 and has resulted in prosecution and imprisonment of crewmen on previous occasions. 29 Judge Fitzgerald thus found that:
"[Tihe Coast Guard inquiry concerning the grounding of the
RYuYo MARU No.2 raises a real danger to petitioners of being
compelled to disclose30 information that might incriminate them
under foreign law."'
As to the second prong of the test, Judge Fitzgerald found
that only the captain and the second engineer faced a strong possibility of prosecution.' 3 ' This finding was based on Mr. Tagawa's
testimony that the MSA had found the captain and second engineer to be at fault in the grounding and referred their cases to the
public prosecutor's office.' 32 With respect to the other three
seamen, Judge Fitzgerald found that since their cases had not
been forwarded by the MSA to the public prosecutor, they had
not demonstrated a real and substantial fear of prosecution and
thus could not invoke the fifth amendment privilege. 33 Judge
Fitzgerald declined to make the analytical leap required to find a
"real and substantial" fear of prosecution simply because one of
the three seamen was the direct supervisor of the second engineer,
on the bridge with the captain at
and the other two were stationed
34
the time of the grounding.1
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

406 U.S. 472 (1972).
Id., at 478-80. See also notes 55-93 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 20 & 96 supra.
Id. and note 94 supra.
Id.
130. Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. at 133.
131. Id.
132. See transcript at evidentiary hearing in Mishima v. United States, 507 F.
Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981) (Case No. A80-142) at 14-17.
133. Id.
134. Judge Fitzgerald declined to consider whether the likely content of the
testimony of the chief engineer, the bosun, and the third officer would enhance
prosecution interest on the part of Japanese authorities in light of their close
physical and professional proximity to the two individuals (the second engineer
and the captain), against whom the Japanese MSA found sufficient evidence to
warrant referral for prosecution.
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Further, Judge Fitzgerald followed conventional constitutional principles and held that the captain had not waived his
privilege against self-incrimination by virtue of his prior testimony before the Japanese Marine Safety agency, as waiver of the
fifth amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding
in which the waiver occurs.' 35 Thus, Judge Fitzgerald found that
as to both the captain and the second engineer the constitutional
question of whether the self-incrimination privilege protects a witness who reasonably fears prosecution in a foreign nation was ripe
and squarely before the court.
Judge Fitzgerald quickly dismissed the prior Ninth Circuit
cases1 36 as having turned on the peculiar secrecy protection afforded by Rule 6(e),137 thus finding that none provided useful precedent outside the grand jury context. He turned, instead, to
38

Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York

English cases with which this article began.

39

and the early

At the outset, he
40

rejected the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in In re Parker.

Judge Fitzgerald accurately perceived the importance of Justice
Goldberg's analysis in Murphy which relied, in large measure, on
the roots of the privilege against self-incrimination found in early
English law. Judge Fitzgerald observed:
A correct understanding of English precedent has great significance since in Hale v. Henkel... the Supreme Court reached

the conclusion that the English rule limited the privilege to the
same jurisdiction under the same sovereign. The careful analysis of the English cases undertaken in Murphy demonstrated
that the conclusion in Hale was simply wrong. .

.

. Accord-

ingly, the Court rejected the narrow application of the privilege
as stated in Hale and approved, instead, the broader construction given by English courts, such as McCrae, and by our own
courts in opinions by Chief Justice Marshall and Justice
135. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir. 1979). See also United States v.

Wilcox, 450 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 917 (1972); United
States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d
818 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977); In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d
Cir. 1953); United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1961), vacatedand
remanded, 368 U.S. 14 (1961); and Annotat. 42 ALR FED. 793 (1979).
136. In re Campbell, 628 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Federal Grand Jury
Witness, 597 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Weir, 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974).
137. See note 66 supra. Judge Fitzgerald apparently accepted the parties' as-

sertions regarding the inadequacy or impossibility of taking testimony in camera,
as that alternative was omitted and not discussed in his decision.
138. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
139. See notes 33-54 and accompanying text supra.
140. 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 96 (1970). Parker, on
the other hand, dismissed Murphy as "an argumentative analogy to this nation's
state-federal relationship [carrying] no further persuasion." Id. at 1070.
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Holmes. 141

Based on this analysis of precedent, Judge Fitzgerald aligned
42 and with Judge Hufstedler's
himself with the court in Cardassi,1
concurring opinion in In re FederalGrandJury Witness.1 43 Judge

Fitzgerald thus concluded that "[A] claim of [f]ifth [a]mendment
protection may validly be asserted by petitioners Mishima and
Sasaki in the underlying Coast Guard proceedings as a protection
against the threat of.prosecution in Japan." 1 "4
So as not to leave any questions unresolved, Judge Fitzgerald
closed with several additional observations. First, the motion to
quash was denied as to three of the seamen because they had
failed to establish a "real and substantial danger" of foreign prosecution.1 45 The motion was also denied as to the captain and the
second engineer because Judge Fitzgerald observed that even a
valid assertion of the fifth amendment privilege by those individuals would not provide a blanket immunity to refuse to answer all

questions at the Coast Guard inquiry. The privilege extended
only to the specific questions which would tend to incriminate the

petitioners in any Japanese prosecution. Judge Fitzgerald ordered
that all other questions be answered.

46

Thus, Judge Fitzgerald

141. Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. at 135 (footnote and citations
omitted).
142. 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972). Compare with United States v. Doe,
361 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In Doe, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected a claim of privilege by a witness
who feared that his answers to questions pertaining to the purchase of firearms in
the United States could be used to prosecute him in Great Britain for smuggling
guns to the Irish Republican Army. In rejecting the witness' claim of privilege,
the Doe Court distinguished Cardassi, stating:
The difference between Cardassi and the case at bar is obvious-the
questions propounded to Cahalane were about his activities in the
United States, not about his activities in either Great Britain or Ireland.
This distinction was noted in Cardassiwhen it was pointed out that if
the questions before the grand jury were framed so as to relate solely to
activities within the United States, no reasonable fear of incrimination
under foreign law could exist [Cardassi,351 F. Supp. at] (p. 1086).
361 F. Supp. at 227. The Doe court also pointed out there was no prosecution
pending against the witness and no statute or case from the foreign jurisdictions
had been cited to show how the witness might be answerable there for his activities in the United States.

143. 597 F.2d 1166, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J., concurring).
144. 507 F. Supp. at 135 (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 133.
146. Id. at 135. Judge Fitzgerald provided no guidance with respect to which
questions the seamen might legitimately refuse to answer. Generally, the privilege against self-incrimination has been construed to extend not only to those
answers which would, in themselves, support conviction under criminal law but
also embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute the witness for a crime. To sustain the privilege, it need only be
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handed the government a technical victory in denying the motions
to quash while sustaining the invocation of the fifth amendment

privilege against self-incrimination for two of the seamen in this
context.
Second, Judge Fitzgerald observed that the government

might still be able to compel the testimony of all of the Ryuyo
seamen if it could demonstrate that the government of Japan

would respect any grant of immunity which the United States
might confer. 147 This would have the effect of rendering the grant
of immunity coextensive with the witnesses' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and would, therefore, require the
148
witnesses to testify.
Finally, based on Mr. Tagawa's testimony at the evidentiary
hearing that the government of Japan has recognized the privilege
against self-incrimination since the post-war American occupation
of Japan, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether a

claim of privilege may be asserted under the fifth amendment by a
foreign national who might be compelled
to disclose the testimony
49
within the foreign jurisdiction. 1
With these rulings and observations, the litigation of the

Ryuyo seamen's claims drew to a close. Neither the government
nor the seamen chose to appeal any portion of Judge Fitzgerald's
ruling.
CONCLUSION

Zicarelli established a two-pronged test requiring a witness to
evident from the implications of the question, and the setting in which it was
asked, that a response to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure would result. See
Hoffmann v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
147. 507 F. Supp. at 135 n. 11 (citing United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940,
946 (2nd Cir. 1977)). However, the government never established or even suggested that the United States' grant of immunity conferred upon the Ryuyo
seamen could somehow be made binding upon the government of Japan.
148. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 78-79.
149. 507 F. Supp. at 135 n.12 and Record at 10-11. The Ryuyo seamen had
previously argued to the court that enforcement of American constitutional
rights and liberties could not be conditioned upon the enforcement of parallel
rights and liberties in foreign nations. Record at 24-25. For example, the court
could hardly tolerate torture or coerced confessions of foreign nationals even if
such procedures were commonplace in their homeland. To do so would establish
two standards of government conduct: one to be used in measuring the propriety
of government conduct in dealing with American citizens and the other to be

used in measuring the propriety of government conduct in dealing with foreign
nationals.

f In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1975) (interpreting rights

in Indian tribes).
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show a real danger of foreign prosecution, and of being compelled
to disclose information which would be incriminating under foreign law, in order to claim a fifth amendment privilege. Zicarelli
and its progeny suggest a variety of factors which may be considered by a court in evaluating the propriety of a witness's claim
including media publicity in the foreign jurisdiction;1 50 the existence of a specific statute in the foreign jurisdiction which would
provide a basis for prosecution;151 the clarity of that statute; 5 2 the
existence of actual interest on the part of foreign authorities in
prosecuting the witness;153 the existence of any rule or statute
which might keep the witness' testimony secret; 5455and the context
in which the questions are asked of the witness.
Mishima v. United States156 takes its place as one of only two

cases in this developing area in which that two-pronged test was
met. Both Mishima and Cardassi,57 having established the factual prerequisite of a "real and substantial danger" of incrimination under foreign law, concluded that the fifth amendment does
protect a witness even in circumstances where the only possibility
of prosecution is under foreign law.' 58 While the rulings of these
two district courts are not binding on other federal districts, the
Circuit Courts of Appeal, or the Supreme Court, it is worth noting
that both reached the same conclusion after analyzing preZicarelli Supreme Court decisions and the history and roots of the
fifth amendment itself.
Implicit but not discussed in Judge Fitzgerald's decision rejecting the claim of privilege by the three seamen whose cases had
not been referred for prosecution is the assumption that the Japa150. This factor, alone, was found to be insufficient to establish a real danger
of foreign prosecution in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation,
406 U.S. 472, 478-80 (1972). With other evidence, however, media publicity may
serve to circumstantially establish awareness of the case on the part of foreign
authorities and interest in pursuing prosecution. For example, the court recognized in In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 n.7 (D. Conn. 1972), that the
existence of a newspaper article reflecting some interest in the case on the part of
Mexican authorities provided an "additional basis, even if disputed, for the witness to fear foreign prosecution."
151. See In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 n.5 (D. Conn. 1972); and In
re Quinn, 525 F.2d 222, 223 (1st Cir. 1975).
152. In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1084.
153. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472,
478-80 (1972), discussed note 150 supra. See also United-States v. Yanagita, 552
F.2d 940, 947 (2d Cir. 1977).
154. See note 162 infra.
155. In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1080, 1083-84 (D. Conn. 1972).
156. 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981).
157. 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
158. 351 F. Supp. at 1085; 507 F. Supp. at 135.
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nese authorities were aware of the conduct of the three seamen,
and had decided that their cases were not worth prosecuting. In
fact, however, the decisions by the MSA were only administrative
in nature; nothing precluded the prosecutor in Japan from bringing charges against all (or none) of the Ryuyo seamen. Thus, even
the remaining three Ryuyo seamen whose claims of privilege were
rejected by Judge Fitzgerald faced the risk that their testimony, if
incriminating, might be used against them in connection with a
Japanese prosecution, particularly if their testimony disclosed evidence of culpability previously unknown to Japanese prosecutors.
A more serious criticism may be levelled at the two-pronged
test itself utilized in Mishima. All of the courts since Zicarelli
which have addressed the issue have assumed that some special
burden rests upon a witness who seeks to invoke the fifth amendment privilege based on a fear of foreign prosecution. Yet, requiring the witness to establish not only that his testimony would tend
to incriminate him under foreign law but also that there is a strong
1 59
likelihood of actual prosecution by the foreign government imposes upon such a witness a greater burden than that borne by a
comparable witness fearing domestic prosecution. Mishima demonstrates how critical an addition this requirement can be: the
three Ryuyo seamen's claims were rejected by Judge Fitzgerald
solely on the ground that their cases had not been referred to the
public prosecutor, and not on the self-incriminatory potential of
their testimony.
Thus, while the typical fifth amendment claimant must establish that his fear of self-incrimination is not remote or speculative,
he is generally not required to establish actual interest on the part
of prosecuting authorities in his case.' 60 Rather, it is generally
sufficient to establish only that the subject matter of the inquiry
and the context in which the questions are asked might furnish 6a
link in a chain of evidence needed to prosecute him for a crime.' '
159. See note 153 supra.
160. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 75-76
(1965). Some courts have refused to require that the witness prove the likelihood
of his prosecution, recognizing the difficulty such a burden would pose for most
witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958),
where the court stated:
We are. . . faced with the novel question whether or not a witness can
invoke his privilege against self-incrimination where practically there is
only a slight possibility of prosecution . . . . We find no justification
for limiting the historic protections of the fifth amendment by creating
an exception. . .which would nullify the privilege whenever it appears
that the government would not undertake to prosecute.
161. See Hoffmann v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951), discussed
note 146 supra.
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The more stringent approach in cases of potential foreign
prosecution adopted by Zicarelli and its progeny may yield troubling results beyond those presented by the Mishima case. Consider, for example, the case of an individual whose domestic
testimony would clearly incriminate him under foreign law, but
whose conduct has not yet come to the attention of foreign authorities. A court could deny his claim of fifth amendment privilege
since he may be unable to show any existing interest on the part of
foreign prosecutors to pursue his case, and actual foreign prosecution is merely speculative. Such a denial, however, would have
the effect of requiring a witness to produce precisely the type of
self-incriminatory testimony
against which the fifth amendment is
62
designed to protect.

As a matter of policy,

63

the fifth amendment privilege pro-

162. It is the assumption of the fifth, ninth, and tenth circuits' grand jury cases
that FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) would effectively prevent foreign authorities from ever
learning of the individual's conduct if the issue arose in a grand jury context.
The assumption is based upon the power given to the district court under Rule
6(e) to preserve the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. See notes 64-73 and accompanying text supra.
The concurring opinion of Judge Hufstedler in Federal Grand Jury Witness,
597 F.2d at 1168-69 and the district court opinion in In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp.
1080, 1082-83 (D. Conn. 1972), however, support the argument that Rule 6(e)
does not adequately protect a witness. Both opinions indicate that any testimony
which a witness provides, even before a grand jury, bears a substantial risk of
becoming public. See notes 74-86 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore,
testimony given before a grand jury may become public whether or not the specific provisions of Rule 6(e) are applied by a district court. A 1980 Government
study, More Guidance and Supervision Needed over Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, by the Comptroller General of the U.S., Oct. 16, 1980 GGD 80-18, 812465 of the federal grand jury system in seven major American cities found 492
"disclosures" of supposedly secret grand jury information between 1973 and
1979, including 328 in 1978 and 1979 alone. The study indicated that the identities of 343 witnesses in the seven cities were revealed by the disclosures, "including five who were murdered, ten who were intimidated and one who
disappeared." The study stressed that many of the disclosures were made legally,
taking place in open court, but others came from administrative blunders such as
leaving files on desks or in unlocked cabinets, or failing to exercise even the
simplest forms of security.
Moreover, Rule 6(e) provides no protection for the witness whose testimony
is sought outside of the grand jury setting. As is evident from the outcome in the
Ryuyo litigation, there is often no means, outside of the grand jury context, by
which a court may insure that testimony provided by a witness will remain confidential. Judge Fitzgerald was unable to insure that the testimony of the Ryuyo
seamen would remain confidential even if taken in camera.
163. [The privilege against self incrimination] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those accused of a crime to the trilemma of self-accusation, perjury
or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating state-
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vides a means by which a person may resist providing testimony
which may contribute to his prosecution. The focus of an examination of a witness's claim of privilege has traditionally been the
implications of the questions, not the actuality or even likelihood
of prosecution. Further, the amendment does not, on its face, concern itself with whether prosecution of the witness may ultimately
be pursued domestically or by a foreign nation. If such is indeed
the policy behind the privilege against self-incrimination, it makes
no difference analytically whether the risk is of prosecution by domestic or foreign authorities. 164
Neither the jurisprudential roots nor the case history of the
ments will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of
fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him....
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55. See also Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886). See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (McNaughton rev. 1961), §§ 225084; Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949);
Franklin, Infamy and Constitutional Civil Liberties, 14 LAW GUILD REV. 41
(1955); Mansfield, The Albertson Case.- Conflict Between the Privilege Against
Sef-Incrimination and the Government's Needfor Information, 1966 Sup. CT.
REV. 103; McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SuP. CT. REV.

193.
164. Three distinctions must be recognized in candidly analyzing the import
of the prior American and English cases which have considered this issue. See
supra notes 33-93 and accompanying text. First, some of the English cases in-volved instances in which a witness whose testimony was sought in a court of law

in one jurisdiction faced possible incrimination or unfavorable consequences as a
result of his testimony in another court within the same jurisdiction. For example, in Brownsword v. Edwards, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ex. 1750) the witness faced
potential incrimination in the English ecclesiastical court as a result of her testimony before the English court of law. Both courts, however, were organized
under the same sovereign.
Second, other cases involved instances in which the testimony of a witness in

a court of one jurisdiction potentially incriminated him under the law of another
jurisdiction, but the second jurisdiction was a colony or possession of the first.
See, e.g., East India Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749). Again, both
courts were organized under the same sovereign.
Finally, the Ryuyo Maru litigation is the only case in the line of United

States federal cases which involved foreign nationals. All the other cases cited
and discussed in this article involved instances in which American citizens
sought to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination based upon their fear
that their testimony in this country could be used by foreign officials. Clearly,

the Ryuyo seamen were especially close to prosecution by the foreign jurisdiction
because they were destined to be returned to their homeland and subjected to the

jurisdiction of Japanese courts.
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fifth amendment suggest that a witness who raises a fifth amendment foreign prosecution claim should be held to a more rigorous
standard than one whose claim focusses upon domestic prosecution. Therefore the rigors of the two-pronged test propounded in
Zicarelli, refined in Yanagita, and utilized thereafter, should be
tempered to afford consistent treatment to all witnesses, regardless
of the source of their potential prosecution.

